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Ilhan Inan’s (2012) approach to curiosity is based on the following cen-
tral theses: (i) for every question asked out of curiosity there is a corre-
sponding term (defi nite description) that is inostensible for the asker (its 
reference is unknown) and that has the function of uniquely identifying 
an object; (ii) the satisfaction of curiosity is always in the form of com-
ing to know an object as falling under a concept. This model primarily 
covers curiosity as our search for empirical objectual knowledge. In my 
critical refl ections, I explore some phenomena of non-objectual curiosity 
which are left out or at least not suffi ciently explored by Inan: curiosity 
as the search for explanation and understanding, and meta-curiosity—
curiosity about the very representations, i.e. how to conceptualize a cer-
tain problem, and what defi nite descriptions to use in the fi rst place.
Keywords: Inan, curiosity, inostensible reference, understanding, 
meta-curiosity.
1.
The Renaissance curiosity cabinets (“wunderkammer”) were collections 
of rare, valuable, historically important or unusual objects, compiled 
for study and entertainment. It is not easy to fi nd the unifying element 
in these collections of oddities. Nowadays, curiosity has become a topic 
of serious philosophical and psychological research. Ilhan Inan’s book 
(2012) is an impressive attempt to unify and conceptualize the phe-
nomena of curiosity in terms of our ability to describe what is unknown. 
To be curious about something we need to be able to conceptualize it; 
we need the ability to represent the unknown.
Defi nite descriptions turn out to be the main linguistic vehicles of 
curiosity. We inquire about “the smallest inhabited island on earth,” 
seek “the element that is causing the bright yellow light in the spec-
trum,” wonder about “the location of the book that was on my table,” 
look for “the reason the book that was on my table was taken,” etc. 
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Inan’s main thesis is that curiosity expressed in language always in-
volves an inostensible term—a term that refers to an object that is un-
known for the speaker, where “object” is taken in the widest logical 
sense (entities, locations, but also reasons, causes, etc.). To quote Inan:
My first central claim is that for every question asked out of curiosity there 
is a corresponding term that is inostensible for the asker that has the func-
tion of uniquely identifying an object (Inan 2012: 42).
…
So my second main thesis is that every instance of curiosity involves the 
conceptualization of an unknown object, a particular, a property, a univer-
sal, a kind, or what have you that could be expressed by a defi nite descrip-
tion. Simply anything that can be referred to by a defi nite description can 
be an object of curiosity (Inan 2012: 130).
So, we proceed by throwing our conceptual nets expressed in terms of 
defi nite descriptions, hoping to catch their referents or the lack thereof. 
Our aptitude for curiosity is based on our ability to describe what is un-
known (inostensible descriptions). Our curiosity is then satisfi ed when 
we are able to convert an inostensible term with an unknown referent 
into an ostensible one (for instance, getting to know the referent of 
‘Neptune’ or “the planet perturbing the orbit Uranus” or else establish-
ing that there is, for instance, no Vulcan; the defi nite description “the 
unique planet perturbing the orbit of Mercury” lacks reference). Our 
curiosity is satisfi ed when we gain objectual knowledge: “The satisfac-
tion of curiosity then is always in the form of coming to know an object 
as falling under a concept” (Inan 2012: 136).
At fi rst sight it might look that this theory is almost trivial, so obvi-
ously true. Compare—question: Who killed the victim? Answer: The 
murderer. Question: What does it mean to be curious about X? Answer: 
The object of curiosity about X is the unknown referent of the term ‘X’. 
However, the task of putting some fl esh on this proposal is not trivial 
at all and the interplay between questions of knowledge and questions 
of language in Inan’s book is both insightful and fruitful.
Still, problems remain. According to W. Pauli there are three grades 
of criticism: Wrong. Completely wrong. Not even wrong. Although Inan 
does a masterful job of defending his view, I will try to show that there 
are cases in which his theory is informative since, according to the 
above Popperian criterion of non-triviality, it escapes the disastrous 
third grade of criticism. It might be wrong, or better, in need of further 
development. Inan mainly works with a relatively “fl at” conception 
of objectual knowledge (and the corresponding ignorance), coming to 
know an object as falling under a concept is based on causal connection, 
sense experience, testimony ..., of the object in question. Yet there are 
other forms of curiosity and other ways of satisfying curiosity, or so I 
will try to argue.
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2.
Let me start with some typical (recently heard or read) questions asked 
out of everyday and professional curiosity:
Why did she use that phrase?
How did this problem arise?
I am really curious about how to make the story of Arya Stark in the city of 
Pentos consistent (said a friend of mine after seeing the sixth season of the 
Game of the Thrones TV series).
Why did the U.K. vote against the E.U.?
Heredity—how does it work?
Why, within Eurasia, was it Europeans who conquered the world and colo-
nized other people, rather than the Chinese or the people of India or the 
Middle East? (Diamond 2016)
We are curious about reasons, causes, consistency ... We look for con-
trastive explanations (Diamond), and sometimes we describe our state 
of curiosity just as: “I was simply curious to see what would happen.” 
Sometimes our curiosity is motivated by a plain and vague desire “to 
get to the bottom of the matter”. An example might be a quote from 
Galileo (Dialogue Concerning the Two Chief World Systems, cited in 
Lambie 2014: 46):
... considering that everyone who followed the opinion of Copernicus had 
at fi rst held the opposite, and was very well informed concerning the argu-
ments of Aristotle and Ptolemy, and that on the other hand none of the 
followers of Ptolemy and Aristotle had been formerly of the Copernican 
opinion... I commenced to believe that one who forsakes an opinion which 
he imbibed with his mother’s milk and which is supported by multitudes, to 
take up another that has few followers ... must of necessity be moved ... by 
the most effective arguments. This made me very curious to get to the bottom 
of the matter.
It is not easy to subsume all of these cases under the search for the 
object falling under a certain inostensible concept. Let me add a de-
scription of curiosity from a recent book on developmental psychology: 
We exhibit something few other species do—the urge to know about things 
that have no obvious or utilitarian function. We experience epistemic cu-
riosity. This leads to the truly astonishing breadth of stimuli, topics, and 
events that seems to trigger the human appetite for information. We not 
only want to know how to get from here to there, what might be scary on the 
pathway home, or whether the plant matter before us is edible (all things 
any decent rodent would also want to know), but we also want to know what 
happened before we were on earth, how people we’ve never met are living 
their lives, how a given building or machine was put together, what caused 
a friend to behave the way she did, and why a certain novelist stopped writ-
ing. (Engel 2015: 9)
Engel draws ours attention to different types of curiosity. According to 
Miščević:
One can be curious about some skill (“How does one ride a bicycle?”) or 
about more propositional and objectual matters. The fi rst kind of target is 
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knowledge how; let us call the other “knowledge wh-”, to encompass both 
knowledge what, whether and why (plus some surrounding sub- kinds, like 
when). (Miščević 2016: 148)
We express curiosity by asking a question but also by taking something 
apart (how does that work?). Inan is preoccupied with the fi rst type 
of curiosity (“knowledge wh-”); his approach seems best suited for ob-
jectual curiosity (and resultant knowledge) expressed by typical “Who 
dunnit?” questions (Who is the person knocking on my door? What ob-
ject is perturbing the orbit Uranus?). But it seems to me that “why?” 
in many of its variations is one of the main linguistic vehicles of our 
curiosity (perhaps even more so than the “who?” or “what?” preferred 
by Inan). We typically look for reasons and causes—how does Inan’s 
approach cover them? Well, by making them referents of inostensible 
terms—“why” abbreviates “what reason” or “what cause”:
And when I ask, “Why was the book that was on my table taken?”, I wish 
to fi nd out the referent of “the reason the book that was on my table was 
taken” or, in some contexts, “the cause the book that was on my table was 
taken”. … I may also ask, “How was the book that was on my table taken?” 
by being curious about the referent of “the way in which the book that was 
on my table was taken.” (Inan 2012: 44—the only place where this topic is 
addressed)
Well, reasons, causes and ways make for strange referents. First of all, 
what kinds of entities are we talking about? Inan says nothing about 
the referents of terms for reasons and causes. So let me try with a plau-
sible hypothesis.
When asking for reasons and causes we typically look for expla-
nation and understanding, and facts are often invoked as ontological 
grounding of explanation. We usually accept: “the fact that the table 
was cleaned by the housecleaner explains the fact that the book on my 
table was taken away,” some would also accept facts as the causal re-
lata (Mellor 1995, among others). So perhaps we can adopt Inan’s posi-
tion with respect to direct questions that admit of a simple “yes” or “no” 
as an answer (“Is there any life on Jupiter’s moon?”). According to Inan, 
the object of our curiosity in asking a direct empirical question is a fact, 
an empirical object that is to be found in the world. A true sentence 
refers to a fact, and a false one fails to refer (Inan 2012: 52). Similarly, 
we might try to postulate facts as candidate referents for inostensible 
terms referring to unknown reasons and causes.
Inan (2012: 191, fn. 14) is well aware that this account “is based on 
the rather controversial claim that truth is a form of reference, name-
ly, reference to a fact (or what I prefer to call a “state”), and falsity 
is simply failure of reference. … it requires a lot more elaboration.” 
Even more so if facts are to serve as potential referents for reasons and 
causes. There is a familiar conundrum in the area of truthmakers—are 
there distinct kinds of facts corresponding to logically complex truths, 
such as negations, disjunctions, generalities? Are there negative facts, 
such as the fact that there is no life on Jupiter’s moon—presumably 
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the answer to the question: “Is there any life on Jupiter’s moon?” Also, 
causes and reasons are often disjunctive: why did the accident happen? 
Because Fred omitted to take precautions. What kind of empirical ob-
ject (fact) is to be found in the world as the referent for Fred’s omission? 
Omissions are wildly disjunctive.
Consider, as a further example, the Columbia space shuttle disas-
ter in 2003—the shuttle broke apart while reentering the atmosphere, 
killing all seven crew members on board. Why did the accident hap-
pen? A piece of foam insulation broke off from the shuttle’s propellant 
tank and damaged the edge of the shuttle’s left wing. How could this 
happen? Strict security procedures were apparently omitted by NASA. 
How so? There were cuts in the funding of the space program. Why? 
Well, after the end of the Cold War space technology lost its strategic 
importance for USA governments.
This story illustrates several problems with the simple idea that 
“what constitutes an answer for one who curiously asks a question is 
the apprehension of an ostensible concept that the asker comes to know 
to determine the same object as the inostensible concept that gives rise 
to the question” (Inan 2012: 64). First of all, the structure of causes 
and reasons is often disjunctive, general or even more complex—the 
inostensible concept that gives rise to the question is correlated with 
ontologically ill-behaved entities. Take Diamond’s question and his re-
ply: Why was it Europeans who conquered the world rather than the 
Chinese? It turns out that Europe had an optimal intermediate degree 
of fragmentation (a too-unifi ed society is a disadvantage, and a too-
fragmented society is also a disadvantage). Diffi cult to pin this down as 
“the object of the inostensible concept.”
Also, as the Columbia disaster story shows, the satisfaction of curi-
osity might be context dependent in more than one way; it is not just 
that the verb “to know” is context-sensitive for objectual knowledge 
(Inan 2012: 151). According to van Fraassen (1980), an explanation of-
fered to satisfy our curiosity is an answer to a why-question. Why P? P 
is the case, as opposed to Q, R, S, ..., because X. The questioner assumes 
a set of possible, although not actualized, alternative states {Q, R, S, 
...}, which together with P are called the contrast class (Why did the 
shuttle break apart in 2003 and not earlier?). We do not just ask why 
P, but why P rather than Q? Diamond (2016) is also a typical example 
of this pragmatics of explanation: “Why, within Eurasia, was it Euro-
peans who conquered the world, rather than the Chinese?” The answer, 
X, must be true and relevant to the question. A relevance relation be-
tween the question and the answer will typically vary with the context 
(the breaking of a piece of foam insulation is relevant in certain con-
texts; the end of the cold war in certain broader geo-political contexts).
Of course, there is always an inostensible description available for 
any “Why X?” question. A simple “the reason for X” or, even more gen-
eral, “the explanation of X” can be postulated as the unknown referent, 
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whatever that might be. But this is just like saying that the “epistemic 
fi le” on X has been opened, but there is nothing in it, or that a fi le 
has been created without any descriptive content. The very posing of 
the “why?” question does this job. The usual synonyms for “why” are 
precisely: For what? For what reason, cause, or purpose? The content 
of the epistemic “fi le” might be sometimes diffi cult to specify but the 
theory should provide at least some structure of the “fi le” in order to 
escape triviality. Will at least the most general “object” do—“the satis-
faction of curiosity is always in the form of coming to know an object as 
falling under a concept” (Inan 2012: 136)?
When asking questions out of curiosity we typically look for expla-
nation and understanding. Consider some standard models of scientifi c 
explanation. According to Hempel, scientists explain phenomena by 
showing that they are logical consequences of general laws. For Salm-
on, events are explained by showing how they fi t into the physical pat-
terns found in the world. The aim of functional explanation analyses 
is to show how the item contributes to the functioning of the system as 
a whole. The model of unifi cation is based on the idea that successful 
explanatory theories unify phenomena. It is not just the simple objec-
tual knowledge (What is the cause?); we seek connections, general pat-
terns, unifi cations and understanding. There is surprisingly little in 
Inan’s book on the topic of understanding and “grand-scale” curiosity. 
For Miščević, this is the central kind of curiosity:
… on the one hand there is curiosity focusing on a simple propositional 
target, on the other, connections-focused curiosity, aiming at understanding 
of connections and reasons and causes, expressed by appropriate why-ques-
tions. Curiosity has often been described as a desire for knowledge and un-
derstanding, and I think this may be the central kind of curiosity. While we 
are examining the target(s) of curiosity it is also worth noting the contrast 
of scope: depth vs. width. Again, one can go wide, in a disconnected, slightly 
chaotic manner, or in search of connections and unifi cation; the latter option 
is more germane to understanding, and more valuable. (Miščević 2016: 149)
There are various accounts of the nature of understanding but they 
all seem to transcend the level of simple objectual knowledge. For Za-
gzebski (2001: 241), for instance, “understanding is the state of com-
prehension of nonpropositional structures of reality”. Elgin (2007: 35) 
in a similar way states that “understanding is primarily a cognitive 
relation to a fairly comprehensive, coherent body of information.”1 Our 
deep quest for understanding the world was strangely refl ected already 
in the very idea of a curiosity cabinet2:
Renaissance wunderkammer were private spaces, created and formed 
around a deeply held belief that all things were linked to one another 
through either visible or invisible similarities. People believed that by de-
1 Quotes are form McCain (2016: 144–154).
2 Tate Britain. “History of the Wunderkammern (Cabinet of Curiosities).” 
http://www.tate.org.uk/learn/online-resources/mark-dion-tate-thames-dig/
wunderkammen (accessed September 7, 2016).
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tecting those visible and invisible signs and by recognizing the similarities 
between objects, they would be brought to an understanding of how the 
world functioned, and what humanity’s place in it was.
Cognitive contact with reality can be established on different levels: 
by knowing who or what, by knowing reasons and causes and fi nally, 
by understanding. I do not think that all questions of curiosity can be 
reduced to the quest for objectual knowledge so masterfully covered 
in Inan’s book. “Why?” of causes, reasons and explanations cannot be 
(easily) accommodated in this model, even less so our desire for un-
derstanding. True, one can always coin inostensible descriptions like: 
“the explanation of this strange fact.” But, in this case, inostensible 
reference seems to be just the name of the problem and not the proper 
solution.
3.
Can we also be curious about something we are at the time unable to 
conceptualize, to describe with an inostensible term? According to Inan 
(2012: 65), “if we cannot express our curiosity by a defi nite description, 
then we really have not expressed a precise question that captures our 
curiosity.” This sounds plausible—the inability to conceptualize one’s 
inquiries is often a sign of confusion and one’s search in the dark. But 
not always. We are able to ascend to higher levels and ask meaning-
ful questions about curiosity itself. We can be curious about the very 
conditions for the cognitive contact with reality: What representations 
to use? How to conceptualize a certain problem? What defi nite descrip-
tions to use? Why should these questions not be allowed as the proper 
focus of curiosity? One way to understand Galileo’s “This made me very 
curious to get to the bottom of the matter” is precisely as a question of 
meta-curiosity: how to approach a certain problem and what concepts 
to use?
Let me illustrate some of these points with the help of a science fi c-
tion novel, His Master’s Voice (HMV), by Stanislaw Lem (published in 
1968, English translation 1984). Its main topic, I would say, is scientif-
ic curiosity—scientists are trying to decode, translate and understand 
what seems to be a message from extraterrestials (specifi cally, a beam 
of neutrinos with regularities from the Canis Minor constellation). The 
story could easily serve as a thought experiment about possible SETI 
scenarios (the current scientifi c search for intelligent extraterrestrial 
life is actually monitoring electromagnetic radiation for signs of trans-
missions from civilizations on other worlds).
By the time the project has ended, the scientists are no surer than 
they were in the beginning about whether the signal was an attempt 
at communication that humanity failed to decipher, or just a poorly 
understood natural phenomenon. The neutrino signal seems to have 
had the effect of increasing the likelihood that life would develop and 
some speculated that the life-producing property of that communica-
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tion could not be the work of chance. But there were many other hy-
potheses. Some speculated that the letter was not meant for humanity, 
and that by pure chance we lay in the path of its transmission between 
two “conversing” civilizations. Also, the signal might have been a math-
ematical description of an object (possibly a molecule), and the scien-
tists were able to use part of the data to synthesize a substance with 
unusual properties. The “form of representation” itself was the object of 
investigation: the letter could be “written” in some declarative-transac-
tional language operating with units of meaning; it could be a system of 
“modeling” signals, such as television; or it could represent a “recipe”, 
that is, a set of instructions necessary for the production of a certain 
object (in the opinion of the Pentagon the message from the stars was 
a kind of blueprint for a super bomb) or a description of a particular 
“thing” in a code that referred only to certain constants in the natural 
world.
Two years of intensive curiosity were mostly spent on formulating 
the proper questions for inquiry—how to conceptualize the strange phe-
nomenon, what kind of inostensible terms to use. The initial question, 
I suppose, was just—what is this? And then the focus shifted to the 
hypothesis that the observed regularities constitute a message. This 
was just a provisional, hypothetical conceptualization, typical, I would 
say, for certain foundational scientifi c investigations. Inan might say 
that the main question of curiosity was: “What is the meaning of the 
signal?” with “the meaning of the signal” as the inostensible term, 
standing for … what, exactly? Meanings make for very strange objects, 
even more so than facts (just consider the eternal search for “the mean-
ing of life”). In the scenario by Lem, this question comes very close 
to the question of meta-curiosity: “How to represent the strange phe-
nomenon?” We might try with a direct question “Does the transmission 
constitute a message?” If yes, is then the object of curiosity a fact, an 
empirical object that is to be found in the world? Recall the hypotheses 
under investigation: declarative-transactional language OR a system 
of “modeling” signals, such as television OR a “recipe”, OR … a wildly 
disjunctive “entity”, diffi cult to understand as the uniquely identifi ed 
object of an inostensible term. Also, due to Lem’s mastery, there is an 
ambiguity between the researcher’s expectations de dicto (a message 
saying that so and so is the case) and the possibility de re—the signal 
itself being the object with the life-enhancing properties or both (not to 
mention the Pentagon super-weapon speculations).
What appears to be a fi rst contact SF story is not a typical novel: it 
lacks an adventure plot, there is almost no dialogue and no action. The 
bulk of the novel is densely philosophical pessimistic refl ections of the 
main protagonist (mathematician Hogarth). The following is a typical 
quote:
In my opinion, the stellar code denoted neither a plasmic brain nor an in-
formational machine nor an organism nor a spore, because the object it des-
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ignated simply did not fi gure in the categories of our conceptualizations. It 
was the plan of a cathedral sent to australopithecines, a library opened to 
Neanderthals. In my opinion, the code was not intended for a civilization as 
low on the ladder of development as ours, and consequently we would not 
succeed in doing anything meaningful with it. (Lem 1984: 93)
This fi nal pessimism about the human predicament is in harmony with 
Inan’s “rule of thumb”—no precise representation (defi nite descrip-
tion), no curiosity. But must we really always “know” what we are look-
ing for in terms of precise representations in order to be curious? HMV 
depicts cognitive puzzlements which are much more common than we 
might initially think.
There is an old joke about a drunkard, searching under a lamppost 
for his house key, which he has dropped some distance away. Asked 
why he didn’t look where he dropped it, he replied “It’s lighter here!”. 
This methodological procedure has been dubbed “the principle of the 
drunkard’s search” (Abraham Kaplan) and also “streetlight effect”3. 
The story sometimes functions as an illustration of observational bias 
where people only look for whatever they are searching for by looking 
where it is easiest. We look for explanatory factors for a given phenom-
enon in a place where the light is already shining and the territory 
is well illuminated by our familiar conceptions. But sometimes a cru-
cial methodological issue involves precisely “meta-curiosity”—the very 
identifi cation of the dimensions of the search.
The story also functions as parable for breaking with the old ways 
of thinking. Inan’s (2012: 153): “... there cannot be curiosity without 
the ability to represent the unknown” can be interpreted as implying 
that we always search under the light of familiar inostensible terms. 
But consider Thomas Kuhn’s conception of normal science—there are 
puzzles, anomalies, “curiosities” to be solved under the “light” of the 
reigning scientifi c paradigm. When anomalies and inconsistent de-
tails signifi cantly threaten a paradigm, a crisis occurs and scientists 
reexamine the conceptual foundations of their science and invent new 
questions. The main object of their curiosity is precisely the accepted 
conceptions and representations of reality.
You might disagree with Kuhn’s model of scientifi c progress—many 
do. Still, I think he is right to stress the importance of scientifi c meta-
curiosity, a search for new representations and new conceptions, when 
open-mindedness and other intellectual virtues usually associated 
with curiosity fl ourish. On the more down to earth level of everyday 
scientifi c activities, there has recently been some discussion about the 
methodology of “fi shing expedition”. In legal contexts this term stands 
for any inquiry carried out without any clearly defi ned plan or purpose 
in the hope of discovering useful information. Very often this is synony-
mous with pure “curiosity-driven” research when this term is used in a 
derogatory manner (similar to Inan 2012, 65: “if we cannot express our 
3 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Streetlight_effect (accessed September 7, 2016).
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curiosity by a defi nite description, then we really have not expressed a 
precise question that captures our curiosity”). The search for Neptune, 
one of Inan’s main examples of de re curiosity, was clearly hypothesis 
driven: look for the planet perturbing the orbit of Uranus. But in the 
opposition between maverick “curiosity-driven” research versus precise 
“hypothesis-driven” research, the stakes are often on the former, as 
Firestein vividly depicts the position of a scientist:
Anyone who thinks we aren’t all on a fi shing expedition is just kidding him-
self. The trick is to have some idea about where to fi sh (e.g., stay out of 
polluted waters, go where there are lots of other fi shermen catching lots of 
fi sh—or avoid them since the fi sh are now all gone from there) and some 
sense of what’s likely to be tasty and what not. I’m not sure you can hope to 
know much more than that. (Firestein 2012: 80)
Scientists are curious beings; that is what makes them scientists. But 
it is diffi cult to capture all forms of their curiosity as having a concept 
expressed by an inostensible term in the form of a defi nite description 
and in search of its referent. A “fi shing expedition” is also an important 
manifestation of scientifi c curiosity!
True, one has to be careful; these are muddy waters. If we do not 
have any precise defi nite description to express our curiosity, then we 
are easily confused about what we are curious about, if anything, as 
Inan rightly points out. As my fi nal example, which nicely illustrates 
these dangerous waters, consider the notorious statement made by U.S. 
Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld fi ve months after 9/11 and a year 
before the invasion of Iraq (in 2003). Intelligence “reports” suggested 
the absence of a link between Saddam Hussein’s regime and terrorists 
seeking weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Rumsfeld responded:
Reports that say something hasn’t happened are always interesting to me 
because as we know, there are known knowns: there are things we know 
we know. We also know there are known unknowns: that is to say we know 
there are some things [we know] we do not know. But there are also un-
known unknowns—the ones we don’t know we don’t know. And if one looks 
throughout the history of our country and other free countries, it is the lat-
ter category that tends to be the diffi cult one. (Rumsfeld 2011: xiii)
Known unknowns are gaps in our knowledge, but we are aware of them, 
we know where to look—the majority of Inan’s examples fall into this 
category (the 98th prime, the space object responsible for the extinction 
of dinosaurs, the shortest spy, etc.). We can potentially fi ll the gaps in 
our knowledge, eventually making them a known known. The category 
of unknown unknowns encompasses the gaps in our knowledge that we 
don’t know exist. Not only may we not have all the evidence we know 
would be relevant, there may be evidence we don’t have that we don’t 
even realize is relevant.
In 2002 Rumsfeld’s unknown unknowns won the Plain English 
Campaign’s annual prize for the “most baffl ing remark made by a 
public fi gure”. It is hard to deny that this was the case of curiosity of 
utmost (life and death for many) importance. For some, Rumsfeld’s re-
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mark was a typical politician’s reply (how to avoid answering the direct 
question about evidence for WMD), others dismissed it as “a little bit of 
amateur philosophizing,” while some actually still agree that WMD re-
ally existed (relocated in a neighboring country). From the philosophi-
cal point of view, at least one epistemologist took seriously the idea of 
the “unknown unknowns”:
To assess how good the evidence was that, e.g., Saddam Hussein had weap-
ons of mass destruction, U.S. intelligence services needed to know not only 
where the available evidence (the “knowns”) pointed, and how secure it 
was, but also how comprehensive it was; and to do that, they needed to 
know what relevant evidence there might be that they didn’t have (the “un-
knowns”). Unfortunately, though they knew what some of the relevant evi-
dence was that they needed but didn’t have (the “known unknowns”), they 
didn’t realize that other evidence, evidence they also didn’t have, was also 
relevant (the “unknown unknowns”). (Haack 2011: 12–13)
I am inclined to agree with Haack’s diagnosis—there are genuine epis-
temological worries about the potential of incomplete evidence to mis-
lead. Is the evidence comprehensive is a legitimate question. But note 
that this is a question of meta-curiosity: What to look for? How to frame 
our curiosity? What representations and defi nite descriptions to use?
The dire consequences of the above reasoning dramatically illus-
trate the important issue of the satisfaction of curiosity. We are less 
prone to admire the epistemological subtleties of the “unknown un-
knowns” when we hear that:
There’s another way to phrase that and that is that the absence of evidence 
is not evidence of absence. It is basically saying the same thing in a differ-
ent way. Simply because you do not have evidence that something exists 
does not mean that you have evidence that it doesn’t exist. (Rumsfeld 2002, 
NATO press conference)4
Well, “the absence of evidence is not evidence of absence” has also been 
used to support the possibility of alien abductions and various UFO 
claims, past life experiences and other pseudo-scientifi c hypotheses. 
Can the absence of evidence about X satisfy our curiosity about X? In 
opposition to Rumsfeld, Inan allows, so it seems, given his discussion 
on Vulcan, for the validity of “absent evidence reasoning.” Leverrier be-
lieved that there was a unique planet perturbing the orbit of Mercury; 
he called it “Vulcan.” The search gave no results, so in this case the fact 
that there was no evidence that anything fell under the concept of “the 
planet perturbing the orbit of Mercury” ended the inquiry. Rightly so, 
sometimes the absence of evidence for a hypothesis amounts to real evi-
dence against it. If the hypothesis were true (the planet existed), some 
evidence favoring it would have been observed.
I think that the evaluation of this last conditional (or, in proba-
bilistic terms, the likelihood of the probability of observing the miss-
ing evidence for H on the assumption that H is true) is crucial for the 
4 http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2002/s020606g.htm (accessed September 7, 
2016).
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evaluation of the cogency of “absent evidence reasoning” as satisfaction 
of our curiosity. The probability of observing at least some evidence 
of UFO abductions is high, so the absence of trustworthy evidence is 
really the evidence of absence (falsity of this strange hypothesis). Com-
pare this to the typical creationist argument: if evolution happened, 
where have all the intermediate forms gone? No evidence for evolution, 
so the theory must be false? But in the case of the fossil record, the 
likelihood of finding the missing fossils is low with respect to evolu-
tionary theory because of the conditions that lead to fossilization. In 
this case the absence of evidence is really not evidence of absence (cf. 
Boudry et al. 2015). How about Iraq and weapons of mass destruction? 
Should we compare the case to the one of Vulcan (no evidence for WMD 
so no WMD), or to the one of evolutionary theory, where the absence of 
evidence is not evidence of absence? The issue is still a matter of some 
curiosity (in 2016), although the verdict is more on the side of the valid-
ity of absent evidence reasoning (some evidence for WMD was expected 
to be found; so, no evidence …).
4.
According to Inan (2012: 137), under normal circumstances curiosity 
is satisfi ed when one is able to convert an inostensible term into an 
ostensible one. Yet the conditions for the satisfaction of curiosity are 
sometimes even less straightforward and relative than he is prepared 
to admit. According to Sextus Empiricos, the Ancient skeptics were the 
only ones who genuinely inquired. Their curiosity led them into exten-
sive investigations into things until they found that they could always 
come up with a suitably plausible alternative hypothesis. Their inquiry 
ended in suspension of judgement. The Pyrrhonists, who described 
themselves as investigators (“skeptikôs”), were some of the most curi-
ous human beings in our intellectual history. Yet they were not looking 
for objectual knowledge; their investigations repeatedly and predict-
ably led them to suspension of judgment as the fi nal stage of their cu-
riosity.
Well, Phyronnians are perhaps philosophical curiosities in them-
selves and not really normal. But are we not, as philosophers, often in 
the position so vividly described in Lem’s novel? To be curious about 
something, you have to conceptualize it, but sometimes the proper 
conceptualization itself is the object of curiosity. When investigating 
a certain phenomenon, philosophers exhibit meta-curiosity: they are 
curious about how to formulate the questions, what representations 
and what terms to use. I was puzzled by the following remark on epis-
temology by Inan:
If an epistemologist does not have any precise defi nite description to ex-
press his curiosity when he asks “what is knowledge?”, then we should take 
him to be confused about what question he is trying to answer and, more 
importantly, what he is curious about, if anything. (Inan 2012: 65)
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It is precisely meta-curiosity that is the important part of philosophical 
curiosity about knowledge: the question of how to approach the subject, 
and what defi nite descriptions to use to express our curiosity. Should 
we look at the epistemic quality of the subject’s beliefs (reliable source? 
luck-excluding properties?), or should we begin with the subject herself 
and assess her epistemic virtues and vices? Should we approach the 
problem apriori, from the philosopher’s armchair, or should we situate 
epistemology within the natural sciences and cognitive psychology in 
particular? Before we introduce precise inostensible terms as our fi sh-
hooks, and then try to catch something, we are genuinely curious, in 
the same way as the scientists in Lem’s novel, about what concepts to 
introduce in the fi rst place.
In the end one has to agree with Inan on the importance of concep-
tualizations and precise descriptions for curiosity. I have argued for a 
relatively modest proposal. It is not true that for every question asked 
out of curiosity there is a corresponding term that is inostensible for 
the asker that has the function of uniquely identifying an object. I have 
tried to draw attention to certain kinds of curiosity which are left out 
or at least not suffi ciently explored by Inan—our search for explanation 
and understanding and meta-curiosity. Both are perhaps the deepest, 
“grand-scale” types of curiosity surpassing the level of simple objectual 
knowledge. Can we speak about uniquely identifi ed objects picked out 
by inostensible terms when it comes to the quest for understanding—
when we look for general patterns, inter-connections and unifi cations 
and when the fi nal “state of comprehension” might even be about the 
nonpropositional structures of reality?
Object level curiosity about X is based on our ability to conceptu-
alize X, to introduce inostensible terms (“the X?”) and look for their 
referents. Meta-curiosity is curiosity about these very representations: 
how to conceptualize the problem? What descriptions to use? What in-
ostensible terms to introduce? Again, one could always introduce inos-
tensible terms, such as “the conceptualization of this problem.” Here, 
also, the inostensible reference seems to be just a different name for the 
problem. True, meta-curiosity is on the brink of confusion, but this is 
sometimes just a different name for a philosophical puzzlement.
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